The Military as Arbiter of Political Conflict

In the July 9 New York Times article "Fuel for a Coup: Perils of Latin America's Oversized Military," Nobel Prize winner, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias wrote that strong militaries in Latin America have paved the way for military solutions to political conflicts in the region. He observed that the coup d'état that led to the ouster of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya is something that is not unexpected in a region that "continues to view armed forces as the final arbiter of social conflicts."

While the Philippines is not as extravagant as Latin America when it comes to military spending, since the days of martial law our armed forces have increasingly taken an active role in trying to resolve our nation's manifold problems. We thought that after EDSA I the re-branding (from AFP to New AFP) and reorganization of the armed forces would eventually lead to its depolitization. But as history would have it, coup after coup have wracked the nascent administration of then President Corazon Aquino.

Yet again under the present administration, the military continued its political involvement in seeking solutions to our socio-political problems during the so-called Oakwood Mutiny despite repeated indoctrination at the nation's premiere military academy and among the ranks of active military personnel against military adventurism. Then there was the Manila Pen incident. The leader of Oakwood, Navy Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes IV, would later on be popularly elected as senator even while he was behind bars.

Coup d'état as a means of achieving change is, aside from being a crime punishable by law, without a doubt unconstitutional. Not even the present constitutional provision defining the role of the armed forces as the protector of the people can legally justify the military's role in acting as the arbiter of the country's political conflicts. That provision was meant to highlight the military's role in protecting the people against external threats or aggression, and not as a prescription against a corrupt government, however appealing the idea may be to others.

Arias says the imbalance between Latin America's fragile democracies and strong militaries, with the scales tipping toward the latter, has much to do with the militray taking an active role on the political landscape. The Honduran experience shows that when Zelaya committed flagrant disregard of the country's Constitution and defiance to its high court's ruling, the military decided to resolve the impasse by arresting Zelaya and whisking him out of the country. The Honduran military's swift action did decisively what the Supreme Court and Congress failed to do: to immediately stop the illegal actions of an abusive president.

The failure of our democratic institutions in maintaining political stability and reigning in of official excesses have left our people looking for answers elsewhere. Idealists in the military have seen this as an impetus for involvement in transforming our society by resorting to extra-constitutional measures. As citizens equally disgusted by the worsening problems in the country, these soldiers follow the route where they have been trained well in seeking the much needed change. And for a country that is yet to see a truly military rule, Marcos's martial law notwithstanding, hard line military idealists would find the idea of a military junta a seductive goal, especially so that previous administration changes have only resulted in installing new faces into power without resolving the country's fundamental problems. The guiding political aphorism, it would seem, is that when democracy fails force becomes a necessity.

To be sure, the armies of other nations are much more powerful and highly trained compared to those of Latin America and the Philippines. But we do not see the United States or United Kingdom being threatened by coup d'états. The reason is their democratic institutions and processes do not fail them. Sure there are failings here and there, but not on a scale as grand as in our country. And solutions are invariably found. In the Philippines we've seen how our democratic processes and institutions have been repeatedly mocked by those in power: until now not a single verdict of conviction has been handed down against the former First Lady Imelda Marcos despite the plethora of cases brought against her, she and her family have reacquired political power, public officals who only earn miniscule salaries continue to live lavish lifestyles, we have a president who committed an act comparable to or even worse than Watergate but continues to remain in power, scandals after scandals are being heaped upon us by government officials who remain unscathed by the scalpel of justice, etc.

For as long as we do not fully mature as a democracy, where our democratic institutions and processes are revered as inviolable, members of the military establishment clamoring for change will continue to see their relevance in instituting political reforms. As long as our politicians continue to tinker with the Constitution and unabashedly violate the law, our institutions fail to cut down official excesses and public officials defy the people's will, the military will remain an active participant of political change.

When GMA Exercises Commander-in-Chief Powers

Once again talks of an impending martial law abound with the recent story in a major newspaper of a so-called "Oplan August Moon," which is allegedly a plan to extend the term of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo by declaring martial rule - to be accomplished by appointment to key military positions of generals loyal to GMA and creation of emergency scenarios reminiscent of the Marcos era. You may want to read Ding Gagelonia and Patricio Mangubat's interesting articles on this issue.

A review of the Constitution tells us that the president can exercise commander-in-chief powers under Art. VII, Sec. 18, which provides as follows:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. . .

The foregoing provision spells out three important powers that the president may exercise in times of national emergencies: (1) calling-out power (2) power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and (3) power to declare martial law.

The calling-out power refers to the power of the president to mobilize the armed forces - whose regular function is to protect the territorial integrity and security of the state against foreign aggressions - in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. In the words of David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Prof. Randy David's first taste of eskrima with GMA), this involves ordinary police action. The Supreme Court also said in this case that the criterion by which the validity of the exercise of this power may be tested is the phrase "whenever it becomes necessary" in Section 18, meaning whenever the president determines there are existing conditions or situations - such as widespread violence, invasion or rebellion - that would necessitate the use of more force in restoring and maintaining peace and order in the country.

The power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (HC) and declare martial law are considered the more expansive exercise of the president's emergency powers. Martial law is distinguished from the president's exercise of his calling-out power in that in the former the country or a portion thereof is placed under military rule while in the latter the armed forces is only called upon to assist the police in maintaining peace and order. HC refers to the process by which a court compels the government to produce before it a person under the latter's custody or to justify the reason for such custody. The suspension of this privilege could lead to the detention of persons without charges.

It should be noted that although traditionally the suspension of the privilege of HC is equated with or follows the proclamation of martial law, the Constitution now makes it clear that martial law by itself does not suspend the privilege and there must be an order for such suspension.

If and when GMA declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of HC she is required by the Constitution to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from such declaration and/or suspension. Here again is where GMA can benefit immensely from her allies in Congress. Notice the following paragraph in Section 18:

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

Unlike the Cha-cha provision in Art. XVII, Sec. 1, there is no equivocation on the manner of voting. The Constitution explicitly allows (in fact it requires it) suspension of the bicameral process by requiring Congress to vote jointly in revoking, affirming or even extending martial law. Given the number of representatives, most of whom being administration allies, GMA can easily get congressional support. And if HR 1109 is any indication the votes alone of the loyal congressmen would suffice to meet the majority vote required.

If this happens the last constitutional resort to question the legality of martial law is the Supreme Court. Unlike in the pre-1987 Constitution era, there is no longer a debate as to whether the courts may look into the factual bases for the declaration of martial law. Where before the determination by the president of the necessity of martial law is binding and conclusive - a political question which the courts may not review - the Constitution now explicitly makes it a justiciable political question by stating in paragraph three of Section 18 that the Supreme Court may review ''the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof." In fact this provision confers a legal standing upon any citizen to bring the appropriate petition.

A word of caution however. David tells us that it will be the petitioner questioning the validity of martial law who must bear the burden of proving the insufficiency of the factual bases relied upon by the president in declaring martial law and/or suspending HC. The problem with this is that there is a strong likelihood that the Court will accord great weight to the executive department's finding of necessity (the Constitution says [1] there is an invasion and public safety requires it or [2] there is a rebellion and public safety requires it), either in subservience to GMA or what amounts to the same thing, in deference to another co-equal branch of government. As the Court ratiocinated in David in finding factual bases for GMA's Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 - declaring a state of emergency - "Owing to her [GMA] Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country."

I would like to believe GMA would be wise enough to cover her base if and when she invokes her commander-in-chief powers by seeing to it there would be sufficient basis for martial rule. In addition to this it would be safe to assume that she would also see to the appointment of sympathetic justices in the Supreme Court, where she is in the enviable position of filling almost half of the Court's membership as several of them retire before her term ends.

Term Extension Scenarios

I am reproducing below an interesting article from ABS-CBN, which is a collection of scenarios it gathered in the course of reporting on the charter change issue and term extension of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The words in italics are my comments. Here it is:

Scenario 1: Shift to a parliamentary system

The House of Representatives will convene a constituent assembly and proceed to amend the Constitution without the Senate. They will approve a change in the form of government from presidential to parliamentary, and lift the restrictions on foreign capital enshrined in the charter. They will then ask the Commission on Elections to hold a plebiscite. A case will subsequently be filed before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court approves the actions taken by a Senate-less constituent assembly, the plebiscite proceeds, and the administration makes sure the amendments are ratified by the people. Instead of presidential elections, parliamentary elections will be held in 2010. President Arroyo runs for a parliamentary seat in Pampanga, wins, and is chosen as prime minister.

Unless Malacañang manages to fill the Supreme Court with appointees who can be persuaded to follow an absurd view of our bicameral legislative structure under the Constitution, it is highly unlikely this scenario will happen. A Senate-less constituent assembly is so patently illegal that only those willing to commit political suicide, or confident that they could get away with it (Supreme Court justices included), would take this position. Although we already have congressmen who took this path, they still have so much to hurdle, legally and politically.

Scenario 2: Senators cooperate

The House of Representatives will convene a constituent assembly with some administration senators. Although the senators who will join the constituent assembly will not be enough to meet the three-fourths vote requirement in separate voting (18 senators), their presence will somehow “legitimize the process.”

The charter amendments approved by the constituent assembly are then subjected to a plebiscite. The Comelec and the Supreme Court go along with the actions taken by the constituent assembly.

If senators join, which appears to be farfetched right now, the House will pursue joint voting to avoid the problems of separate voting. The issue then on the modality of voting will be brought to the Supreme Court.

Scenario 3: Martial Law

The House of Representatives convenes a constituent assembly without the participation of the Senate. There will be street actions, but violent incidents organized by elements against democracy take place. President Arroyo will then have a basis to declare martial law.

Commenting on scenario three, Soliman said this can happen if the protests are not organized. “It [martial law] will make us vulnerable to infiltration and manipulation. When we act, we must be organized,” she said.

It's possible that con-ass congressmen, in tandem with Malacañang, are taking this direction, given their insistence to pursue a clearly illegal act of proposing amendments to the Constitution without the Senate which, as we are seeing, is continuously galvanizing the public to pour into the streets in protest.

Scenario 4: Shift after Elections

The House of Representatives convenes as a constituent assembly, a case is filed before the Supreme Court, but the process takes so long that it is overtaken by the 2010 elections. Charter change fails. Nevertheless, Mrs. Arroyo runs for and wins a congressional seat in Pampanga. But as soon as the 15th Congress is convened in 2010, charter change is approved, and there is an immediate shift in the form of government from presidential to parliamentary.

Congresswoman Arroyo becomes Prime Minister.

This is interesting, and there are indications that it might just happen, given former DOJ Secretary Gonzalez's view that President Arroyo will run for a parliamentary seat and aspire to become Prime Minster if and when the Constitution is amended, and the president's close political allies in Pampanga are hinting or encouraging her to run for Congress.

(With a report from Carmela Fonbuena, abs-cbnNEWS.com/Newsbreak)